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Abstract
Public investment in infrastructure and the like do not usually yield direct pecuniary returns to the
public exchequer. Instead public capital leads to increases in factor productivity in the private
economy. This paper argues that government typically shares in the latter gains via the tax-
expenditure policies. Consequently the discount rate relevant for the investment is ultimately the
same rate, as that required for valuing the future gains. However, it is important to note that these
productivity gains are subject to aggregate economic shocks. From the perspectives of a counter
factual experiment whereby the risky revenue flows serve as collateral for public borrowing, one
may derive the risk discount rate that the capital market would set. This paper applies the above
methodology to the United States, uses budget data for the period, 1950-1995, and shows that while
the risk discount would typically exceed the risk free rate, it remains well below that facing a
private investor. The intuition here is that the portfolio of assets embedded in the state's revenue
claims provides additional diversification than is available through financial markets. Consequently
even investors holding well-diversified stock portfolios may legitimately view claims on state
revenue as vehicles for further risk shifting.
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1The Public Discount Rate and the Uncertain Budgetary Flows
"Mr. Kenneth Clark, the chancellor of the exchequer, conceded yesterday, that the Treasury had made a
'mistake' in its forecast for this year's government revenues...The chancellor said that his scope for cutting had
been severely limited by a shortfall in revenues, which meant that borrowing was running well above the
forecast.." (Financial Times, May 13, 1996)
1. Introduction
Government revenue and expenditure are both subject to influences of the aggregate risks embedded
in the tax base(s). By taxing uncertain streams of income, profit, and transactions, the government
transfers risk onto the budget constraint. Depending on the state of nature, the eventual spending on
programs such as social insurance would deviate from the planned level. It is implausible that the risk
characteristics of the revenue system would offset those of the expenditure pattern (i.e., both flows
covarying together). Question then arises of the market value of public revenue, and therefore the true
size of expenditure that a government may be able to finance in steady state. To follow through, this
paper examines the stochastic nature of budgetary flows, and attempts to measure the systematic
component, and quantify the “risk premiums” associated with various tax revenue sources and public
outlays.
In parts of the literature there is a presumption that revenue risks were just as costly for the state to
bear as for private agents (Bulow and Summers (1984), Gordon (1985) and Hamilton (1987)).
Corporate tax revenue is often cited as a prime example. In contrast, the return on human capital risk is
believed to be largely idiosyncratic [Eaton and Rosen, (1980a, b) and Varian, 1980], but individuals
cannot directly benefit from human capital risks, as they are unable to trade in such risks.
Consequently, the government may pool across the latter risk, and improve on the market allocation.
Thus a diversified revenue base of a modern economy may indeed present investors with an additional
risk-shifting device, and allows them to achieve greater diversification than is otherwise available
through the market.2
In the financial economics literature, one usually measures the risk premium for a stochastic yield by
comparing the latter with an all-encompassing index of the economy wide risk, namely the market
portfolio. Frequently, the market portfolio is likened to a broad stock market index, which would
represent a sizeable part of the corporate economy.3 However, Shiller (1993) points out that the risks
that are traded in today’s financial markets are only a small fraction of all the risk society is exposed
to.4 In searching for a broader measure of market risk, it is plausible that one add in the systematic risk
inherent in the aggregate output shocks. Our hypothesis then is as follows. For a given choice of the
market risk index, to the extent government revenue has less than a perfect correlation with the former,
it is conceivable that expected utility maximising investors would view claims on public revenue as
2vehicles for further risk shifting. Consequently, the market value of risky revenue would be positive.5
By contrast, was the correlation to be exact [the alternative hypothesis], as has been alleged by Bulow
and Summers to be the case with corporate tax revenue, the market value would be negligible:
"..[Government] can only finance programs whose budgets may have a certainty equivalent of zero"
(1984, p21). In this latter event, as they put it, there is no free lunch here.
Given that we analyse the riskiness of a tax revenue flow by treating the latter as an yield on a risky
asset, the procedure calls for further motivation. Let us consider the simplest case namely, the
corporate income tax (CIT). The total CIT base is clearly the sum of pre-tax net income of all firms.
One may therefore interpret the present tax base as a stream of net revenue flows arising from a
portfolio of corporate equities, where care has been taken to add up each (type of) agent’s income by
its relative weight in the total. Given a particular tax schedule, in this instance the rate of tax, and for
simplicity allowing full loss-offsets, the tax revenue would therefore embody the same risk
characteristics that afflict equity prices.
Further note that, assuming economic depreciation in the tax schedule, the net income of a firm is the
conceptually correct measure of its return on capital, and changes in its level essentially constitute the
accrued capital gains on the firm’s equity. Were this source to be the sole revenue claim of a
government, and it wished to borrow, lenders could logically demand an expected rate of return that
reflects the riskiness of the de facto collateral asset, namely the tax base. Claims on future corporate
revenue may therefore be seen to be formally similar to yields on risky assets.  The case of other tax
revenue is similar. One important distinction would be that the underlying portfolio might not be
traded in any actual market unlike the CIT base.6 An obvious example is that of the personal income
tax (PIT) revenue. Here the tax base consists of returns to human capital, individual capital and
entrepreneurial income. Again the taxable part is in the nature of an income net of direct costs of
earning income, and thus has the interpretation of a return on the totality of human, entrepreneurial and
physical capital stock attributable to the personal sector of the economy. The latter capital is mostly
untraded in actual markets, and hence it is conceptually important to develop an appropriate measure
of the systematic risk facing such incomes both for descriptive as well as normative purposes. The
remaining taxes (notably, payroll, domestic goods and services, foreign trade) may be similarly
motivated.
One has to be cautious, however, with treating tax revenue flows similar to the streams of net profit
from real or financial assets. The realised values of tax revenue and expenditure flows depend not only
on risk factors such as the business cycle, but also on structural changes in the tax and spending codes
and the rate schedule, albeit with a lag. These latter elements suggest that the realised revenue yield (or
3actual expenditure) in a given period remains, at least nominally, under the direct control of the
government, unlike the behaviour of asset returns. A typical example would be an anticipatory
counter-cyclical fiscal policy to combat a bad state of nature. However, as Barro (1979) has argued,
governments appear not to change the rate schedule and tax code too frequently due to concern over
the efficiency costs of such perturbations. Thus even though observed variations in the growth rates of
revenues and expenditures may suffer from the noise due to legislative tinkering with the code, we
show that one may still obtain an unbiased estimate of the "riskiness" of the tax revenue and
expenditure flows.
Our approach to measuring the riskiness of revenue and public expenditure has interesting
implications for several related issues in public economics, namely the choice of the social discount
rate, size of sustainable debt, and for programs financed by earmarked budgeting. Let us dwell on
these briefly, beginning with the discount rate. Note that public investments (e.g., infrastructure)
would plausibly lead to enhanced productivity of labour and capital in the private economy. Given a
well functioning tax system, such private sector gains would lead to higher government revenue on
account of augmented wages, profits, and transactions. The risk characteristics of the augmented
revenue flow (or, equivalently, of the debt instrument for which these are collateral claims) may not
match that of the market portfolio, or that of other securities actually trading in the market. We show
below that the discount rate relevant for evaluating such future gains, that is to say for the public
investment decisions in the first place, should reflect the risk inherent in the future returns to physical
and human capital.
Turning to the size of debt, were the Bulow-Summers scenario to prevail for overall revenue
(admittedly an extreme hypothesis), no positive debt would be sustainable, as the market value of
future revenue would be negligible. More generally, however, one can go on to model the limit to debt
size under steady state conditions. The implications for ear-marking are rather evident; should the
source of finance be very risky, not only would the program output have an unacceptable level of
volatility, borrowing against future revenue (from the same source) would appear unwise due to its
low market value. Consequently, ear-marking could be practised only in limited instances where,
either, the revenue source had little systematic risk, or, by coincidence, both demand for the service
and revenue claims were near perfectly correlated.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Our approach calls for a measurement of the degree of riskiness
embedded in revenue and government outlays, and hence their market values. We do this for the US
economy over the period, 1950-95. In the process we analyse the aggregate revenue and outlay of the
federal government, as well as their major components. In section 2, we review the revenue and
4expenditure profiles, and carry out a preliminary analysis of their mutual correlation as well as against
a measure of market risk index (namely, the S&P 500). Based on asset-pricing models, a theory of the
evaluation of risky revenue is developed in section 3, which is then applied to the present data set in
section 4. Next a discussion and application of the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) is offered in section
5. Implications of the analysis for the public discount rate is reviewed in section 6, while a few
concluding remarks are collected in section 7. An appendix deals with the stability of the parameter
estimates.
2. Revenue and Expenditure Behaviour in the US, 1950-95 7
Revenue and Expenditure Data: We begin by measuring the variability inherent in the flows of public
revenue and expenditure through time. Naturally we deal with real (i.e., net of inflation) values of all
variables. Variability may be examined at level values of a series or transformations thereof (e.g., first
differences). For statistical reasons, stationarity being a principal argument, we have chosen to express
the public flows in growth rates per period (Sobel and Holcombe, 1996). Additional refinements are
explained as we proceed.
Revenue Behaviour: Figure 1 below shows the pattern (i.e., year-on-year real percentage change) of
the two largest revenue items of the US federal government over the 1950-1995 period, namely the
corporate and the personal income tax revenue. It is obvious that corporate tax revenue has been more
volatile than personal income tax revenue. Further note that both the revenue streams tend to move in
a pro-cyclical manner over the business cycle. The amplitude of the swings of the corporate tax
revenue is however more pronounced.
Table 1 provides us with some descriptive statistics on the per capita real growth in various tax
revenue sources for the US (federal) government over the same period.8 These include sample results
such as the mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation and the range. From the table we observe
that practically all the mean (per capita) rates of growth have been positive and quite large. The mean
growth in (per employee) social insurance contributions (SIC) is the largest with the smallest standard
deviation. Highest standard deviation is observed, not unexpectedly, in the case of the corporate
income tax (CIT). The coefficient of variation (CV), defined as standard deviation per unit of mean
growth, is given in the fourth column. Examined in light of CV, one can observe that the year-on-year
fluctuations in corporate tax revenue have been most volatile during the 1950-1995 period.9 Volatility
in this flow is also apparent from the observed large revenue growth de to the expansion of economic
activity (1951-52) during the Korean War. Moreover, the recession of the early 80s caused corporate
tax revenue to drop by 28 percent in 1983. The table also shows that while both CIT and the personal
income tax (PIT) revenue have grown at about the same pace, the latter would appear to be much less
5risky. The healthy growth in these revenues can be attributed, mainly, to the long run productivity
increase over the period.
Examining the variance of a variable gives us a picture of the total risk of an uncertain stream. We
would eventually want to separate total risk into its components, namely systematic and unsystematic.
Only by so partitioning the risk, can we analyse how volatile has the growth in specific categories of
tax revenues and government outlays been relative to the return on the market portfolio. Frequently
one refers to the excess return on the market portfolio, ERM, (i.e., here the mean return on the S&P
500 index less the risk free rate), as the market risk premium. Figure 2 below compares the market risk
premium in period-t with the “excess return” from the corporate tax revenue moved one period
forward, i.e., in period (t+1).10 The graph indicates that the market return does indeed lead the growth
in corporate tax revenue by a year. The graph is suggestive of a positive correlation between the two
variables. The similarity in the pattern of variability between ERM and CIT revenue is also implied by
the summary statistics (Tables 1 and 2).
Figure 1
Table 2 shows that over the sample period the mean real return on the stock market index has been
9.17 percent (with a standard deviation of 15.57). The table also shows that the corresponding mean
market risk premium (ERM) has been 7.91 percent (with a standard deviation of 15.49). These figures
are in accordance with the equity premium literature [e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985)]. The summary
statistics provide an indication that corporate tax revenue flows may have been just as volatile as the
stock market yield.11
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6Table 1: Statistics on Annual Rate of Growth of Tax Revenue, 1950 –1995
Name Mean
Growth
Standard
Deviation
CV Minimum
(Year)
Maximum
(Year)
GRPIT 3.10 7.68 2.48 -10.51 (71) 27.83 (51)
GRCIT 3.15 16.64 5.28 -28.00 (83) 47.93 (52)
GRSIC 5.28 6.04 1.14 -3.23 (76) 21.82 (51)
GRET -0.21 10.46 NA -17.81 (82) 51.45 (81)
GRT 2.83 6.85 2.42 -9.34 (55) 23.80 (52)
Notes. GRPIT: Real rate of growth of the personal income tax revenue per person;
GRCIT: Real rate of growth of corporate income tax revenue; GRSIC: Real rate of
growth of social insurance tax and contributions per employee; GRET: Real rate of
growth of excise tax revenue per person; GRT: Real rate of growth of total tax revenue
per person. All data have been adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator.
Table 2: S & P 500 Index for the Sample Period: 1950 –1995
Name
Mean
Return
Standard
Deviation
CV Minimum
(Year)
Maximum
(Year)
RRM 9.17 15.57 1.70 -30.87 (75) 44.40  (55)
ERM 7.91 15.49 1.96 -26.50 (75) 44.52 (55)
Note: RRM = dividend yield plus the capital gains component, and computed as:
RRM=((SP500t+DIVt)/SP500t-1-1)×100 less the inflation rate. Inflation was
computed using the GDP Deflator. ERM is the total return of the S&P500 index
minus the return earned on the safe asset as proxied by the three-month Treasury bill
rate.
Below (Table 3) we present the correlation matrix between the market risk premium, (at time-t), and
the year-on-year rate of change in tax revenue (at t+1) from different sources. It is seen that all sources
of tax revenue have a positive correlation coefficient both with the market excess return, and mutually
among the categories. For example, the degree of correlation between the risk premium and the
percentage change in corporate tax revenue is 0.567 (with a standard error of 0.124), which happens to
be the highest among all tax sources, though statistically less than unity. The correlation of the rate of
growth of the personal income tax revenue per person (GRPIT) and the market excess return is 0.380
(with a standard error of 0.139). The latter figure is less than that for the corporate revenue which is
rather intuitive, and may indicate support for the theoretical hypothesis expounded by Eaton and
Rosen (1980a, b). Table 3 also reveals the pronounced positive correlation between personal tax
revenue and other tax revenue sources, but again the coefficients are all less than unity, i.e., a less than
perfect relationship. It is therefore plausible that the government may combine different sources of
revenue in order to achieve a greater diversification of its revenue stream.
7Expenditure Profile. We now examine the risk characteristics of government outlays. Figure 3 shows
how the risk premium on the stock market varies with the rate of change in the direct payment to
individuals, which points to a negative relationship, albeit with a time lag. This is clear during the first
oil shock in 1974 and during the recession in the early 80s and 90s. Hence it would appear that if the
market were to predict a softening of the economy today, transfer payments to households would tend
to rise a year hence.
Figure 2
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Revenue Variables
ERM GRPIT GRCIT GRSIC GRET GRT
ERM 1.000 0.380
(0.009)
0.567
(0.000)
0.434
(0.003)
0.219
(0.143)
0.530
(0.000)
GRPIT 1.000 0.625
(0.000)
0.417
(0.004)
0.115
(0.447)
0.916
(0.000)
GRCIT 1.000 0.403
(0.005)
0.031
(0.837)
0.819
(0.000)
GRSIC 1.000 0.108
(0.477)
0.579
(0.000)
GRET 1.000 0.181
(0.228)
GRT 1.000
Notes: p-values are shown in parenthesis below the estimated correlation coefficients.12
Table 4 below provides a few descriptive statistics on the real growth rate of federal outlays per capita
during the sample period, while in Table 5 we present the estimates of the degree of correlation
between the risk premium on the stock market and governmental outlays. The mean rate of growth of
social insurance payments (GSIP) is 5.05 percent. From the CV figures, it is seen that national defence
Corporate Tax Revenue and the Market Risk Premium
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8spending (GNDF) comes first in terms of volatility. Moreover, the risk premium on the stock market
index is found negatively correlated with several categories of the real growth of per capita federal
outlays. These are direct payments to individuals (GDPI), total non-defence spending (GTND), and
grants to state and local governments (GSLG). The negative correlation between ERM and GDPI
signifies a possible insurance role for the state through the budget process. Notice also that most
expenditure categories are positively related amongst themselves. A notable exception is that of
national defence spending, which appears to grow at the expense of the rest of the federal programs.
The observation that national defence grew by 89% in 1952 while direct payments fell by 33% a year
earlier further illustrates the zero sum nature of the pattern.
Figure 3
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Annual Federal Outlays, 1950-1995
Name Mean
Growth
Standard
Deviation
CV Minimum
(Year)
Maximum
(Year)
GSIP 5.05 8.38 1.66 -29.91 (51) 35.06 (50)
GDPI 4.94 8.99 1.82 -32.75 (51) 36.71 (50)
GSLG 6.02 6.79 1.13 -5.60 (73) 24.98 (72)
GATE 3.72 6.71 1.80 -9.68 (51) 18.10 (81)
GNDF 2.54 17.18 6.76 -16.26 (55) 88.87 (52)
GTND 3.65 7.16 1.96 -29.09 (51) 16.25 (75)
GGOV 3.13 7.47 2.39 -9.37 (54) 43.62 (52)
Notation. GGOV: Rate of growth of total governmental outlays per person; GSIP: Rate of
growth in payments to individuals per person; GDPI: Percentage change in direct payments to
individuals per person; GSLG: Percentage change in grants to state and local governments per
person; GSIP = GDP + GSLG, GATE: Percentage change in net interest payments per person;
and GTND: Percentage change in non-defence governmental outlays per person. GNDF: Real
rate of growth of government defence spending.  Again, all figures are net of inflation.
Direct Payments and the Market Risk
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9Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Expenditure Variables
ERM GGOV GTND GNDF GDPI GSLG GATE
ERM 1.000 0.017
(0.911)
-0.355
(0.015)
0.198
(0.187)
-0.339
(0.021)
-0.302
(0.041)
0.076
(0.614)
GGOV 1.000 0.1186
(0.432)
0.753
(0.000)
0.007
(0.711)
-0.010
(0.953)
-0.023
(0.881)
GTND 1.000 -0.489
(0.000)
0.695
(0.000)
0.278
(0.061)
0.139
(0.358)
GNDF 1.000 -0.434
(0.003)
-0.204
(0.173)
-0.152
(0.314)
GDPI 1.000 0.303
(0.041)
-0.000
(0.999)
GSLG 1.000 -0.119
(0.430)
GATE 1.000
Notes: The p-values are shown in parenthesis below the corresponding estimated sample
correlation figures. 
3. The Valuation of Risky Flows and Discounting
The Discount Rate. The key focus of the present paper is on the appropriate risk discount rate for the
public sector, which has important bearings on how one appraises the current and future budgetary
requirements for public investment. Why do we necessarily relate the discussion to the stochastic
properties of public revenue and expenditure? Consider public investment in projects where there
exists a certain degree of market failure, such as health, education, and infrastructure. Investment in
these sectors would not typically lead to direct revenue gains to the public sector in a quid pro quo
fashion, thus rendering a direct enumeration of costs and benefits of the project difficult. Instead the
investment would give rise to private sector gains via enhanced productivity of human and physical
capital.13 Depending on the design of the tax-transfer mechanism in force, the private gains alluded to
above would lead to higher public revenue and/or reduced transfers, in each case reducing the deficit
and lessening the need for further borrowing. Viewed in this light, the stochastic behaviour of the
future revenue and expenditure implications of current public investment would appear to be the
appropriate device for taking riskiness of the project into account. We thus depart from the Arrow-
Lind hypothesis that the returns from the public investment were independent of other components of
national income. Hence we propose to measure the degree of systematic risk inherent in the stream of
future public revenue and spending obligations, and relate these to the determination of the social rate
of discount.
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We start off with the approach advanced by Hirshleifer (1964, 1966) and Sandmo (1972). The
methods used by these authors can be viewed as being consistent with the standard “capital asset
pricing model” (CAPM) developed by Lintner (1964), Mossin (1966) and Sharpe (1964). In order to
apply this methodology, one needs to conceptualise terms such as the current market price of future
revenue entitlement. To motivate the discussion, consider a government willing to borrow currently
the market value of its future revenue claims (due k-periods from now). In the process, we assume that
the purchasers of government bonds hold a diversified portfolio of assets, and consequently, when
valuing the risk embedded in the bond, they would naturally evaluate the riskiness of future tax
revenue. In other words, being versed in CAPM, they would “compute” the covariability of the
revenue flow with the return on the market portfolio. Once a particular public revenue flow has been
assigned a “price”, one is led to the idea of the return that the holder of the entitlement would earn
from such a hypothetical debt instrument.
The above reasoning leads to the following equilibrium relationship:
(3.1)
E R R
E R R
E R R
pt ft
p
mt ft p
pt ft p
( )
( ), ,
( ) ,
−
= − ∀ >
= ∀ =
β β
β
  for 
,      for
0
0
where E denotes the conditional expectations based on all information currently available, Rpt is the
“real rate of return” implicit in the (risky) revenue and expenditure flows under consideration, Rmt is
the rate of return on the market portfolio in period-t, while Rft is the risk free rate of a zero-beta asset
at time-t. The beta is the measure of portfolio risk, and is defined as β = {cov(Rpt, Rmt) /σ2m }, where
σ2m is the variance of the market portfolio, and the numerator is the covariance between the growth
rate of the public flow in question and the return on the market portfolio.
The above relationship states that in equilibrium the expected excess return per unit of risk for any
stochastic flow would equal the expected market risk premium.14 Should a portfolio have an excess
return per unit of risk greater (smaller) than that on the market portfolio, and should agents possess
homogeneous expectations, the portfolio will be in excess demand (excess supply). Consequently, its
“price” would increase (fall), and the expected excess return to fall (rise) until the equality is re-
established.  Thus the discount rate which explicitly adjusts for the riskiness of the revenue stream, is
given by the following security market equilibrium condition:
(3.2) δ β=  E(R ) = R +  [E(R - R )]pt ft mt ft
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Pricing Revenue Entitlement: Returning to the conceptual experiment of a bond transaction described
above, note that rational portfolio investors would be willing to lend to the state at time-t the amount
Pt in exchange of the promise of the stochastic flow Tt+ k, k-periods later:
(3.3)
t t
k=0
t+k
k+1P = E
T
(1 + )
∞∑ δ
In the expression above, Pt may be interpreted as the current “market price” of a claim on the future
revenue stream, and δ is the risk discount rate as explained above.15
Return to Revenue Entitlement: Once we have determined that a risky stream {Tt+ k} has a current
market value of Pt, one may ask what the implicit rate of return is to the investor holding the debt.
Clearly the standard answer is the internal rate of return (IRR). To illustrate the use of this concept, it
may be instructive to consider some special cases in an explicit stochastic environment. Consider a
particular stochastic flow, {Tt+k }, which is independently and identically distributed through time. The
market value would then be (from 3.3):16
(3.4a) Pt = {T0 / δ}, where T0 = E{Tt } = E{Tt+k }, all k.
In this simple context, the debt yields a return of δ per dollar of investment, Pt. Thus once we use a
pre-determined and constant magnitude, δ, as the discount rate, it also serves as the implicit rate of
return, or the IRR. 
How does the above valuation change when we allow a secular growth in the stochastic flow, Tt+k ,
such that Tj = (1+g){Tj-1 }, all j? In other words, the growth rate is taken to be independent of the state
of nature. Again retaining the hypothesis of identically distributed risks, i.e., E{Tt+k } = {(1+g)
k E(Tt )},
all k, we obtain:
(3.4b) Pg t =  {T0 /(δ -g)}, 
where, as before, T0 = E{Tt }. Were g to be positive, the investor would value the public flow higher,
and thus would pay a larger amount than in (3.4a), i.e., Pgt > Pt. It would be conceptually helpful to re-
write (3.4b) in two equivalent forms:
 (3.4c) T0 /Pg t  = (δ - g),
Or, (3.4d) {(T0 /Pg t ) + g } = δ.
In either case, the left hand side is in the nature of an annualised expected return on an investment,
while the right hand side is the yield per dollar of investment on an alternative asset that offers a
12
similar pattern of revenue. It is a matter of indifference whether we describe the valuation as one
yielding a return of (δ-g) per dollar invested [and view the corresponding annual flows to be T0 , as in
(3.4c)] , or, one yielding a rate-δ, with the expected income growing at the non-stochastic rate-g, as in
(3.4d). The latter is perhaps more natural.
The actual public flows we work with do not however behave like perpetuities, and thus actual
growth, (gt), would be time dependent. (We, of course retain the hypothesis that risks are
independently distributed over time.) Moreover, since the measurement of covariance between a risky
public flow and the market premium is an issue we pursue below, we find it convenient to write the
expected annual return net of the risk free rate. Consequently, the above equilibrium relationship, in
view of (3.2), may be restated as:
(3.4e) E(Tt /Pg t  + gt - Rft ) ≡  E(Rit  - Rft ) = β [E(Rmt - Rft )],
where, Rit is interpreted as the return on investment inclusive of the growth element. Thus there is a
linear relationship between the expected return on investment, net of the risk free rate, and the market
risk premium.
Evidently, if some tax revenue stream were actually independent of any systematic risk, the
appropriate discount rate would be the rate on risk free assets, namely δ = Rft, as the market beta
would be zero. An example may be the wage tax revenue. It is plausible that in a diversified economy
such revenue would become riskless in the aggregate.17 At the other extreme, Hirshleifer and Sandmo
highlight a result where public investment leads to a pattern of revenue that perfectly covaries with the
market portfolio (and, hence, a beta of unity). The public discount rate, therefore, coincides with the
rate applicable to private projects with the identical market risk premium. In such a world, the public
sector must emulate private firms in order to achieve allocative efficiency.
There is however a clear parallel between the approaches of Arrow-Lind, Hirshleifer-Sandmo and
ours. In all these contexts the rate of discount applicable to a public investment is argued to depend, at
least in principle, on the type of investment. While the first two sets of authors’ belief in the
interdependence of the yield in public and private investments differ, we devise a mechanism that
enables us to put the debate to an empirical test.18 Like Hirshleifer-Sandmo, we agree that the
stochastic behaviour of the revenue yielded by the public investment in question (vis-à-vis the market
premium) is the determining factor. Moreover, we go on to motivate that an evaluation of the
particular tax revenue flow being augmented (or, for that matter, of the expenditure category being
alleviated) by the said public investment is a plausible way of going about the measurement of the risk
of public investment yield.
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4. Empirical Results
We have already noted that for econometric purposes, it is instructive to analyse the underlying
variability in a flow by studying its growth rate. In the CAPM framework, one usually measures the
covariability between the excess return on the market portfolio and that of another asset.
Correspondingly, we work with the growth rate in the public sector flows when adjusted for the risk-
free rate.19 It so happens that most of the revenue-expenditure series under review here yield positive
net growth in real terms over the whole period. However it is important to stress that these "excess
growth" figures in public flows do not arise out of a trade in the corresponding revenue base, and
hence are devoid of any useful normative interpretation. However, to the extent the underlying revenue
base (or expenditure category) is subject to variability caused by aggregate risks facing the economy,
there will be a correspondence between these observed growth figures and the market risk premium.
The object of our econometric work is to isolate and interpret these latter effects.
Following equation (3.4e) we posit that the true, but unobservable, theoretical risk premium associated
with a public flow is linearly related to the market risk premium over the sample period:
(4.1) i t+1 f t i mt ft i t+1
R R  (R - R ) + e( )
*
( ) ( )( ) .− =+1 β
In the expression above, the dependent variable, namely, (R*i (t+1) - Rf (t+1) ), is the true unobservable
risk premium associated with the source-i at time (t+1), and ei (t+1) is a random element. For reasons
already alluded to above, the estimation process is likely to encounter the measurement error problem
for both the dependent and the independent variables. First, let us take the dependent variable. The true
unobservable risk premium associated with the tax revenue or outlays would be measured with an
error due to lags in revenue collection and in implementing spending programs, noise arising from tax
code and rate schedule changes etc. Focussing on taxes, we may generally write the revenue function
as
(4.2) Tt = F(τt ) Bt (F(τ), N,  Z, P),
where Tt is the real tax revenue the government receives from a given source, F(τt) is the tax
schedule, and Bt(F(τ), N, Z, P) denotes the tax base. In addition to the tax schedule itself and the
level of population, N, the tax base is modelled as dependent on the state of nature (Z) and, say,
productivity shocks (P). The realised rate of growth of the actual revenue stream, therefore, may be
decomposed into the components as shown in (4.3) below.
The first term, %∆F(τt), is the direct impact of the percentage change in the tax schedule on the
stochastic rate of growth of the revenue stream. The second term is the growth in the base due to
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population growth. The third term is the indirect impact of the (dis) incentive effects of changes in
the tax schedule on the tax base, Bt. Although the sign of the first term depends on the direction of the
actual tax change, the sign of the third term is generally ambiguous at the analytical level. However,
most researchers believe that increased taxation does create disincentive effects, especially in the area
of labor and capital income taxation, and hence would lead to a long-run reduction in the growth of the
revenue streams. The fourth term represents the impact of direct changes in the tax base due to tax
code changes.
The final term is the direct impact of the state of the economy, and it is this quantity that may be
associated with the "risk premium"; it does measure the degree of variability in the revenue growth
that is associated with the business cycle. This however is not observable, and we proceed by
expressing the observed revenue growth as follows:
(4.4) R i(t+1) = R*i(t+1) + vi(t+1)
where R*i(t+1) is the unobservable component due to the business cycle, and vi( t+1) is a randomly and
independently distributed error term. Evidently the latter would depend on changes in the tax schedule,
population growth, the incentive effects of the tax rate change on its base, and the impact of the tax
code or tax base changes. We further assume that this "error" term has a constant mean, αi and
variance σ2v. We first remove the population growth rate from the observed growth in public flows
(except for the corporate tax revenue). [Correspondingly, we net out the rate of change of employment
from the growth rate of social insurance contributions.] These steps allow us to remove the secular
growth rate, as was discussed earlier.20
Even after these adjustments, the mean of the error term could be non-trivial if, for example, a
particular tax system causes a reduction (increase) in the average growth rate of the revenue stream
due to strong disincentive (incentive) effects. Consequently, if the least square technique were applied
when the dependent variable is measured with error it will lead to increased standard errors, though the
estimated "riskiness" coefficient would remain unbiased and consistent. In view of (4.1) and (4.4), the
estimating regression becomes:
( . ) % ( )
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%
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B
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(4.5) i t+1 f t i i mt ft i t i t+1R
R  (R - R ) +  w e( ) ( ) ( ) ( )− = + ++ +1 1α β
As one can observe the estimation (4.5) could result in a biased constant term. The bias would depend
on the expected mean value of the measurement error. In the base case, whereby the mean
measurement error is equal to zero, the terms of (4.3) are each zero, except for the last term, and hence
the observed growth should be proportional to the market risk premium.21 In the latter scenario, the
model reduces to that given by equation (4.1) since it would have been possible to filter out all the
"noise" from the actual public revenue and expenditure growth rates. This is very hard to accomplish
in practice. If the first term of (4.3), the rate of change of the tax rate, has an average value that is non-
zero and all the other terms were negligible, and we did not filter out this "noise", our estimation
would yield a significant intercept term with a zero beta coefficient. The situation gets muddier if we
also allow the other components to play a non-trivial role.22 In principle, one may develop methods
that permit a role for additional components affecting the rate of growth of the revenue stream, and
indeed an attempt is made to use a more general asset pricing model below. However, in this section
of the paper, we stay with the standard CAPM. 
The problem of using least squares will be more severe if the independent variable were also measured
with error. This would be the case if the return on the market portfolio (i.e., portfolio that includes all
assets, tradable and nontradable) were not the same as the excess return on the S&P500 index. In this
instance, the estimated coefficient for the riskiness term will be both biased and inconsistent. Since we
believe that the true market portfolio consists of assets beyond those traded in the market, we provide
a correction of the measurement problem by means of the method of group averages.23 Accordingly,
we estimate the model by first ordering the observed pairs by the magnitude of the independent
variable and then allocate these among three groups of approximately equal size. The riskiness
estimator is then given by:
Before we turn to the results, a few more comments on the estimator are in order. The estimated beta
can often be negative in which case the revenue implications of a public investment project happen to
be negatively correlated with the market return. The latter eventuality may arise on the expenditure
side of the budget (e.g., in the case of unemployment insurance benefits). This would be a clear
example of a systematic risk item that provides additional insurance to society. Hence, an investment
that led to alleviation of such spending ought to be discounted at a rate below the risk free rate.
Furthermore, we note that one major difference between the beta of a private investment project and
( . ) $
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
4 6
1 1
3
1 1
1
3 1β =
− − −
− − −
+ + + +R R R R
R R R R
i t f t i t f t
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that for the risky national revenue (or, for that matter, uncertain public outlays) is that the latter is
unlikely to be greater than one.24 This is rather intuitive; since the tax revenue derives from a basket of
collateral assets (i.e., tax bases), not all being traded, which places an upper limit to the estimated beta.
The estimation results are summarised in Table 6 below.25 Since we have chosen to adopt the S&P
index as the market portfolio, we also present a measure of the beta between the former and another
potential reference portfolio, namely the Dow Jones index. The latter representing a well diversified
portfolio of assets ought to have an intercept equal to zero, a beta of unity, and have a very high degree
of correlation with the S&P 500 index. The empirical evidence does bear this out; we obtain a beta of
unity and the degree of correlation between the two indices is about 96 percent. The above is a useful
backdrop against which to interpret our results. Our estimates suggest that there is systematic risk
associated with the individual and corporate revenues, direct payments to individuals, total tax revenue
and the overall budget balance.26 On the taxation side, both the social security contributions and PIT
are among the least risky sources of revenue. Among the expenditure items, total government
spending, and interest payments to service debt contain no apparent systematic risk.
Though systematic risk appears to affect mainly the revenue side of the federal ledger, even then the
relevant beta coefficients are, as expected, each less than unity. The corporate tax revenue stream, not
Table 6: CAPM Estimates of β’s for Tax Revenues and Outlays using the Method of Group Averages:
1950-9527
Name
αI =E(v)
H0: αi=0 Beta H0: β = 0 Adj Var(eit) Ho: β = 1 D-W
Ha: αi ≠ 0 Ha: β > 0 R-Sq Ha: β < 1
t-stats t - stats t-stats
ERDJIA -0.772 -1.233 1.040 24.950 *** 0.932 17.34 0.97 1.93
Taxation Items
GRPIT 0.721 0.506 0.189 2.071 ** 0.068 69.22 -8.76 *** 2.19
GRCIT -1.695 -0.695 0.647 4.136 *** 0.264 203.05 -2.25 ** 2.08
GRSIC 2.818 2.446 ** 0.160 2.165 ** 0.076 45.32 -11.35 *** 2.41
GRT -0.098 0.083 0.248 3.258 *** 0.176 48.05 -9.87 *** 2.16
Expenditure
Items
GDPMT 5.050 3.757 *** -0.236 -2.738 *** 0.126 61.70 1.75
GGLSG 5.759 4.726 *** -0.148 -1.892 * 0.054 50.72 1.83
GND -0.889 -0.283 0.272 1.349 0.018 336.14 2.15
GATE 2.419 2.224  ** 0.028 0.401 -0.019 40.42 1.70
GRTND 4.379  3.679 *** -0.251 -3.292 *** 0.179 48.38 2.43
GGOV 1.928 1.361 -0.007 -0.072 -0.023 68.50 2.06
Note: *** indicates that the beta is statistically significant different from the null hypothesis at the 1 percent
level of significance, while ** does so at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level.
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surprisingly, has the highest beta, a value of 0.65. Given the standard error, we are able to reject that it
is equal to unity at the five- percent level.28 In Figure 4, we provide an illustration of the best-fit line,
which clearly does not coincide with the 45-degree line from the origin. The evidence seems to
support the proposition that the corporate tax revenue is less than perfectly correlated with the market
portfolio. Moreover, the constant term [i.e., αi in eq. (4.5)] is not statistically different from zero. Thus
we find evidence that changes in the tax code/schedule do not affect the mean growth of the CIT
revenue. Given that actual tax rates are not state contingent, these observations may be seen as
consistent with Gordon's analytical result (1985) that corporate investment incentives remain largely
unaffected by corporate taxation. The relatively low R-squared value, however, is caused by
measurement errors in the data leading to a high standard error of the regression.
The total revenue stream is significantly less risky than the market portfolio as shown by a beta of
0.248. The rate of growth of payroll (i.e., the social insurance) tax has the least systematic risk (with a
beta of 0.16) among the revenue items. However, the constant term is significantly different from zero,
which suggests that changes in the structure of the social security tax rate over the period may be the
contributing factor.
On the other side of the ledger, direct payments yield a beta of (-) 0.24. It is very intuitive that if the
return on the market portfolio were to fall in a given period, future output and employment will be
expected to decrease, and as a result payments to individuals (e.g., unemployment insurance and
welfare payments) would be predicted to rise. Continuing with the expenditure categories, note that
transfers to state and local governments do appear to be less risky than direct payments to households.
One should be careful in interpreting the apparent absence any systematic risk in total government
spending (GGOV); offsetting influences of defence spending and, say that of transfer payments to
households may well neutralise any inherent risk.29
5. Macroeconomic Factors and the Volatility of Budgetary Flows
In the preceding section we exclusively focused on the hypothesis that systematic capital market risk
would explain the riskiness of budgetary flows. Presently we broaden our approach, and explore the
extent to which the stock market and the revenue-expenditure flows may each react to movements in
macroeconomic variables. This leads us to adapt the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) due to Ross
(1976) to the task at hand. The APT model measures an asset's riskiness using the "beta" sensitivities
to macroeconomic factors. More specifically, the APT model assumes that the rate of return on an
asset is a linear function of k factors:
(5.1) it it i1 1t i2 2t ik kt itR =  E( R )+ b F + b F + + b F + u
*
• •
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where Rit * is the i-th asset’s rate of return in period t, and the constant term is the mean return on the
asset, which is conditional on all relevant and available information. The Fkt, is a zero mean k-th factor
common to the return on all assets under consideration, while the bik is the i-th asset's "beta"
sensitivity to the k-th systematic factor, and uit is the idiosyncratic risk of asset i where E(uit)=0, and
E(uit
2)= σ2i . Recall that the “asset returns” in the present context are the growth behaviour of tax
revenues, public expenditure categories, and the stock market indices.
Figure 4: Scatter diagram and best-fit line of the risk premium on the Corporate Tax revenue
The common factors encountered in the finance literature generally include inflation, output, the risk
premium and the term structure of interest rates [e.g., see Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Burmeister
and Wall (1988)]. Proceeding in the latter tradition, our investigation first lead to only one common
factor, namely that of short run movements in output growth per person, which appears to be relevant
to the growth behaviour considered in the paper.30
We use a simple forecasting equation to determine the common factor. We hypothesise that forecasts
of expected growth rate of the GDP per person at time-t, E(gt), is based on the sample mean:31
(5.2) t 0 1tg = a + F
where F1t is the factor in question. The estimated constant term will give us an estimate of the long run
growth of output per person, the sample mean in our case. The results from this estimation are
presented below:
(5.3) t = 2.12, (t-stat: 5.74)
The macro factor is therefore proxied by the difference between the actual and the estimated trend
GDP growth, i.e.,
Corporate Tax Revenue and Market Risk Premium
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
The Lowest, Medium, and Highest Mean Excess
GRCIT
19
(5.4) 1t t tF = g - g$ .
Thus the one-factor APT model that we estimate next may be restated as:
(5.5) Ri (t+1)* -Rf (t+1) = α0  + α1t F1t  + uit ,
where the left-hand side denotes the real net rate of growth in the variable-i at time-(t+1). For the
budgetary flow categories, the net rate should ideally remove all elements other than those subject to
influence by the systematic risks considered in the model, i.e., those related to physical and human
capital.32 The implication is that, Fk, being zero mean variables by construction, the constant term
would have the interpretation of risk premium. And, consequently, the coefficients, αk, would be
interpreted as the relevant "beta". However, in the present case, the constant term reflects both, the risk
premium and the mean measurement error:
(5.6) Ri (t+1)  - Rf (t+1) = α0 + α1  + α1t F1t  + wit + uit.
Table 7 reports the "beta" sensitivities of tax revenue, governmental outlays and the market index to
the zero mean GDP factor, F1t. We again use the method of group averages because we suspect that
the estimation of the true macroeconomic factor may involve measurement errors. We obtain new
insight from the evidence presented. While the corporate tax revenue and the behaviour of the stock
market rate of return was seen earlier to have been one of strong co-variability (i.e., a beta statistically
close to unity), they are affected quite differently by the common macroeconomic factor. A one-
percent reduction in economic growth in period-t, relative to what the investors predicted, will lead to
a two-percent reduction in the market excess return in period-t, (i.e., the relevant beta sensitivity being
2.02). And much the same goes for PIT and total revenue growth.33 However, the same magnitude of
unexpected reduction in economic growth leads to a much larger reduction (five- percent) in the
growth rate of corporate tax revenue. (The beta here is 4.90.) Clearly these estimates imply that the
consequences of an unanticipated output shock are rather dramatic, especially for corporate revenue.
Finally, in order to determine whether the public sector flows have a high beta vis-à-vis the
unexpected movements in the stock market, we add a second factor. The latter reflects the unexpected
change in the risk premium on the S&P 500 index, i.e., the component that is not explained by the
preceding common macroeconomic factor (GDP shock):
(5.7) 2t mt ft mt ft 1tF = R - R -  E( R - R / F )
Consequently, the estimating equation becomes:
(5.8) Ri (t+1)  - Rf (t+1) = β0  + β1t F1t  + β2t F2t  +  wit + uit .
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The purpose of including this variable in the estimating model is to attribute explicitly the total risk
into a part that is due to the macroeconomic factor and that due to the stock market. The results are
presented in Table 8. As expected the adjusted R-squared has increased since the added variable is
significantly different from zero in practically all cases. We again find that the rate of change of
budgetary flows is still sensitive to unexpected movements in the stock market, but the "beta"
sensitivities are all significantly lower than encountered earlier in the CAPM framework. These
coefficients are well below unity for all variables, except of course, for the Dow Jones index where the
estimated beta is precisely equal to unity. A 10 percent unexpected reduction in the stock market
return, due to factors other than GDP deviations from trend, is seen to lower the corporate tax revenue
by about four percent. This is sharply lower than the figure of 6.5 percent found in the context of the
standard CAPM.
Table 7: The One Factor APT model using the Method of Group Average
Name Expected
Growth
Sensitivity:
Unexpected
GDP Shocks
Adj
R-Sq
D-W
ERM 7.910 2.200   ** 0.070 1.97
Ho : α11 = 0, t-stats 3.591 *** 2.097   **
GRCIT 3.423 4.903 0.379 2.14
Ho : α11 = 0, t-stats 1.774 * 5.331   ***
GRPIT 2.217 2.021 0.230 2.04
t-stats 1.989 ** 3.804   ***
GRT 1.863 2.023 0.300 2.13
t-stats 1.978 ** 4.507   ***
GSIC 4.083 0.765  0.032 2.06
t-stats 4.020 *** 1.581
GDPMT 3.182 -1.569  0.138 1.36
t-stats 2.766 *** -2.862  ***
GGLSG 4.589 -0.334 -0.013 2.44
t-stats 4.223 *** -0.646
GND 1.259  2.377  0.053 1.84
t-stats 0.474  1.879 *
GATE 2.641  0.338 -0.009 1.90
t-stats 2.831 *** 0.761
GRTND 2.391 -0.491 -0.004 1.74
t-stats 2.110 ** -0.909
GGOV 1.876 0.710 0.012 1.91
t-stats 1.564 1.243
Notes. The asterisks beside t-stats bear the usual interpretation as described above (e.g., Table 6).
Our analysis of the US federal budgetary flow data therefore reveals that the corporate revenue and
total tax revenue are both very sensitive to the systematic capital market risks. Unanticipated GDP
fluctuations appear to exert strong influence, quite independent of the stock market deviations, on the
market indices, as well as on several major budgetary flows, including the CIT, PIT, total revenue and
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transfers to households. We also observe that even though corporate tax revenue appears to be
particularly risky, the government by collecting revenue from many different sources presents a more
diversified portfolio than the market, thereby incurring a very modest risk premium. Taken in
conjunction with the evidence of risk shifting via the social insurance system, our results suggest that
the state may indeed be able to absorb the revenue-expenditure risks at a lower cost than private
individuals who hold a diversified portfolio of traded assets.
6. Discount Rates based on Estimates from Asset Pricing Models
The estimates based on asset pricing models may be utilised to predict the implied risk premium for
public investment financed out of tax revenue, which are shown in Table 9 below. We present results
based both on CAPM (Table 6) as well as the APT (Table 8) formulations. Not surprisingly, the
corporate tax revenue has the highest estimated risk premium, namely 5.1 and 3.5 percent,
respectively, under CAPM and APT.  The latter estimates translate to a discount rate of 6.4 and 4.8
percent, respectively. While significantly lower than the private market figure of 9.2 percent, these
rates are sharply higher than the real risk free rate of 1.3 percent.
The personal income tax has a much lower risk premium of 1.5 percent (CAPM) or lower (1.0 percent
under APT), but these estimates are not particularly robust. Total revenue, which yield strongly
significant estimates, point to discount rates in the range of 2.7 to 3.2 percent in the two cases
highlighted here. The latter rates are considerably lower than any plausible figures one would have for
private risky projects, where many projects would likely be even riskier than the market portfolio.
Thus even though the state carries some systematic risk in the budget constraint from the revenue
system as a whole, the implied premium is rather small in absolute terms.
Returning to the Arrow-Lind contribution, it is interesting to observe that the difficulties raised by the
corporate tax was noted, though not dealt with, by these authors (p.366). Our analysis suggests that,
given a well functioning tax system, it would be erroneous to continue to believe in the plausibility of
the contemporaneous independence of returns from a public project and GDP. In the context of the
hypothesis advanced here, namely that the pecuniary benefits accruing to the public sector from a
public investment have the stochastic behaviour of the general (i.e., total) tax revenue, we reach a
simple conclusion. Though small in absolute margin, the risk discount rate for the public sector would
exceed the risk free rate, possibly by a multiple in excess of two.
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Table 8: The General APT Model using the Method of Group Averages: 1950-1995
Name Expected
Growth
Beta
Sensitivity:
Unexpected
GDP Shocks
Sensitivity:
Unexpected
“Stock
Market”
Shocks
Adj.
R-sq
D-W
ERM 7.91 2.200 0.070 1.97
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 3.59 *** 2.101 ***
ERDJIA N.A 1.442 1.040 0.931 1.93
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats N.A 5.739 *** 23.99 ***
Ho : α22=1, t-stats 0.980
GRCIT 3.423 4.903 0.446 0.529 2.34
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 2.038 ** 6.124 *** 3.881 *** 
Ho : α22 = 1, t-stats -4.814 *** 
GRPIT 2.217 2.021 0.126 0.261 2.12
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 2.030 ** 3.883 *** 1.685 *
GRT 1.863 2.023 0.177 0.407 2.20
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 2.148 ** 4.894 *** 2.980 ***
GSIC 4.083 0.765 0.155 0.368 2.51
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 4.222 *** 1.660 * 2.349 **
GDPMT 3.182 -1.569 -0.130 0.173 1.26
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 2.823 *** -2.922 *** -1.686 *
GGLSG 4.589 -0.334 -0.136 0.042 2.36
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 4.343 *** -0.664 -1.880 *
GND 1.259  2.377  0.144 0.045 1.87
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 0.472  1.871 *  0.787
GATE 2.641  0.338  0.019 -0.031 1.88
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 2.801 ***  0.753  0.291
GRTND 2.391 -0.491 -0.171 0.086 1.63
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 2.209 ** -0.953 -2.311 **
GGOV 1.876 0.710 -0.029 -0.008 1.90
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 1.564 1.230 -0.353
7. Conclusion, Extensions and Further Work
Until now the literature on the proper risk discount rate for public investment has been of an analytical
nature. Even then Arrow-Lind wondered if the correlation between returns to a public investment and
other components of national income may be so high as to invalidate their analytical result which
presumed no correlation (p. 373, 1970). Built on the hypothesis that stochastic behaviour of the
benefits of (public) investment accruing to the public sector has the characteristics of budgetary flows,
we have provided an analysis of the inter-face between the riskiness inherent in the latter and that
exhibited by the stock market returns. We find plausible evidence that the said correlation is highly
significant, even though the implied risk premium is fairly small in absolute terms. Whether one views
these estimates as having refuted the original Arrow-Lind hypothesis of no correlation, remains an
issue for further investigation, presumably utilising more complete constructs of the market risk.
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Sandmo had earlier observed that the extent of the approximation of the Hirshleifer-Sandmo model of
an ideal stock market economy to the real world was an awkward empirical question (1972, p. 296).
We do suggest a procedure and, in our interpretation, the public returns from investment in
infrastructure and the like do not match that of any “comparable” private projects, “having the same
proportionate time-state distribution of returns” (Hirshleifer, 1966, p272). Government revenue
appears to have covariability with market risk in physical capital that is significantly less than perfect.
Indeed the largest risk premium applying to a public sector flow, i.e., the case of corporate revenue, is
seen to be about half as large as the market risk premium, the latter presumably being the lower bound
to the risk of a private investment project. Public investment projects would thus be candidates for a
lower discount rate than the rates prevailing in the private sector.
Our final remark addresses the issue of the appropriate measure of market risk. The stock market
indices appear to respond rather significantly to fluctuations in economic aggregates such as GDP
deviations from trend. So do most major revenue-expenditure flows. One would thus be tempted to
conclude that the stock market risks are an inadequate description of the full gamut of the systematic
risk confronting our economic environment. Thus even if it were to access resources at a lower
discount rate than the private sector, this need not by any means suggest that the government is
enjoying a free lunch; the resulting additional risk shifting through the budget process is the offsetting
ledger entry.
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Endnotes
2 This is especially true for individuals who face high transaction costs, or who are liquidity constrained, or
are not aware of the diversification possibilities that the market offers, or when the share prices become too
volatile relative to what the fundamentals dictate.
3 The idea of the portfolio of assets traded in the stock market being used as a proxy for the market portfolio
has been challenged by Roll (1977) as the former excludes the non-traded assets (e.g., unlisted assets or claims
thereto).  However, recently J. Campbell (1996) has re-defined the market portfolio to include the return on
human capital.
 4 Shiller observes that corporate dividends account only for three percent of national income. However
focusing exclusively on this low value is misleading for a number of reasons. Dividends are not the sole, or
even the primary, form of return from share holding.
5 An alternative approach would be to posit a model of intergenerational risk shifting where revenue risks even
if perfectly correlated with the market portfolio would be viewed idiosyncratic by a representative generation,
given the belief that the latter's own revenue risks would be borne by all future generations. See Gordon and
Varian (1988) and Ahsan and Tsigaris (1998) for further elaboration.
6 We abstract from the fact that many firms organised as corporate entities for tax purposes are closely held,
and hence not traded
7 The tax revenue and government expenditure data were obtained from the U.S. public accounts.
8 The real rates of growth of the various tax revenues in this section, except for corporate tax revenue, have
been adjusted for population growth. The social insurance taxes have been adjusted for employment growth.
9 Sobel and Holcombe (1996) also find evidence that, of all revenue categories, corporate tax base has been
the most volatile over the business cycle.
10 The stock market data were obtained from Robert Shiller’s home page.
11 The high variability of the CIT revenue (vis-à-vis the market risk premium, ERM) would appear to run
counter to the intuition that by allowing ex-ante depreciation, CIT revenue may not adequately share in the
capital risks (namely, economic depreciation) embodied by capital assets. Below we shall see that the
estimating CAPM equation for CIT also yields an insignificant error term, implying a negligible role for
changes in the tax code/schedule. See Bulow-Summers (1984) for the distinction between ‘income’ and
‘capital’ risks for physical capital.
12 These results were obtained by running regressions between the variables after they had been standardised
(i.e., all variables were expressed as deviations from their respective mean and divided by the standard
deviation). The slope coefficients represent the sample coefficient of correlation between the original
variables.
13 It is usual to make a distinction between public and private benefits and costs arising out of a public
investment project. The issues of the social discount rate applies only to the component accruing to the
public sector (Arrow-Lind, 1970).
14 Sandmo’s condition for optimal investment required the marginal product of capital to equal the future
value of the market risk premium since he effectively let the beta be unity (1972, equations 32 and 33).
15 In the finance literature this basic valuation formula has been disputed on grounds that asset prices display
excessive volatility relative to the anticipated stream of future dividends. (See Shiller, 1981.)
16 We require that the state balance the budget in the long run.
17 While such a conclusion would appear to be formally similar to the Arrow-Lind result (1970), the methods
are different. The hypothesis here is, much in the spirit of Samuelson (1964) and Vickrey (1964), that the risk
is totally idiosyncratic, and by the law of large numbers, government can effectively pool across individual
differences. The Arrow-Lind argument, on the other hand, lets the state invest in a variety of projects whose
returns are assumed to be uncorrelated with private capital.
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18 So far the discussion in the text has remained within the perfect markets case as required by CAPM. It
must be noted that the deeper aspect of the Arrow-Lind contribution deals with incomplete markets. They
show that so long as the risks are “publicly borne” by many agents, the total costs of risk bearing are
negligible. Even this result, however, requires the assumption of contemporaneous independence of returns
cited above.
19 In empirically determining the systematic risk, we remove the risk free rate from the growth rate of revenue flows,
which leaves the residual in a form analogous to the market risk premium. However this step is not necessary for the
corporate tax revenue due to the deductibility of interest payments allowed in the tax code.
20 Appendix 1 presents the results with population growth included in the revenue growth figures.
21 For example, Summers and Bulow (1984) argued that corporate tax revenue should have an expected
return equal to the market risk premium E(Rit+1)=E(Rmt-Rft), and a beta of unity. Thus the certainty
equivalent (or, the market value) of this revenue flow if re-distributed back to the same generation of
taxpayers would be zero.
22 Notice that ordinarily the change in the tax disincentive effects, which alters the effective base, would be
indistinguishable from the direct manipulation of the base by the Treasury.
23 One could have used the instrumental variable technique but there aren’t many variables that are highly
correlated with the excess return on the market and, at the same time, un-correlated with the error term.
24 This is true for the country as a whole but it is not true if we had examined each state’s corporate tax
revenue streams since they may well be industry specific.
25 The method of group averages can be viewed as a special case of the instrumental variables method. The
instrument used is such that it equals -1 if the pair belongs in the 1st group, 0 if it belongs to the 2nd group
and 1 if it belongs to the 3rd group. For more details, see Kmenta's text, "Elements of Econometrics".
26 The net social insurance contribution is the real growth rate of social security tax less the real growth of
social insurance payments. Empirical evidence indicates that the social insurance tax and contributions have
little systematic risk. Thus the aggregate risk associated with the net social insurance contributions arises
from that associated with the social insurance payments. This observation may be verified from the next
table of the paper.
27 Appendix 2 presents the least-squares results.
28 Regressions were also run with both current and one-period lag market excess returns as explanatory
variables. In all cases the lagged variables turned to be insignificant, which is consistent with the efficient
markets hypothesis.
29 Appendix 3 presents the results without the Korean War period.
30 In our search for the common factors, we also looked at the unexpected inflation. While this yielded a
significant negative influence on the market excess return, but had no effect on the behaviour of corporate tax
revenue and the other budgetary flows.
31 We also used a simple AR1 process to determine the factor component of the growth rate of real GDP but the
results did not change significantly. The coefficient of the propagation mechanism turned out to be
insignificant.
32 Expected changes in tax rates and policies could affect the estimated coefficients. We discuss stability of
the estimated model parameters in the appendix. 
33 On the use of time subscripts, there is going to be a bit of untidiness; note that while the output shock
affects the stock market contemporaneously, both these quantities affect the tax variables one period hence.
Compare (5.6) and (5.8).
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Appendix 1: The Robustness of the Riskiness Coefficient: Population and Employment growth
Table 6A: Estimated βeta for Tax Revenues and Outlays using the Method of Group Averages: 1950-95
Name αi H0: αi=0
Ha: αi ≠ 0
Beta H0: β = 0
Ha: β > 0
Adj
R-Sq
Var(eit) Ho: β = 1
Ha: β < 1
D-W
Taxation Items t-stats t - stats t-stats
GRPIT 1.877 1.309 0.196 2.132 ** 0.073 70.16 -8.41 *** 2.18
GRCIT -1.695 -0.695 0.647 4.136 *** 0.264 203.05 -2.25 ** 2.08
GRSIC 4.532 3.901 *** 0.157 2.105 * 0.071 46.10 -11.31 *** 2.31
GRT 1.058 0.886 0.255 3.328 *** 0.183 48.66 -9.73 *** 2.15
Expenditure Items
GDPMT 6.206 4.587 *** -0.229 -2.641 *** 0.117 62.50 1.78
GGLSG 6.915 5.653 *** -0.141 -1.797 * 0.047 51.11 1.78
GND 0.266 0.845 0.279 1.376 0.019 339.86 2.15
GATE 3.575 3.334 *** 0.035 0.507 -0.017 39.27 1.73
GRTND 5.535 4.613 *** -0.244 -3.176 *** 0.168 49.18 2.44
GGOV 3.084 2.156 ** 0.0003 0.003 -0.027 69.91 2.08
Note: *** indicates that the beta is statistically significant different from the null hypothesis at the 1 percent
level of significance, while ** does so at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level.
The inclusion of the population growth rate merely increases the mean measurement error (i.e., the
intercept), but leaves the slope coefficient (i.e., the "riskiness" measure) largely unaffected. This is
what one would expect a priori. Indeed the mean error for all streams increases by the sample average
growth rate of the population (i.e., 1.156%, except in the case of SIC, where it rises by the sample
average employment growth of 1.714%). This test indicates that our betas' are robust.
Appendix 2: Least Square Estimation of the CAPM 
Table 6B: Estimated βeta for Tax Revenues using the Least Squares Technique: 1950-95
Name Alpha H0: α = 0
Ha: α ≠ 0
  Beta H0: β = 0
Ha: β > 0
 Adj
R-Sq
 Var(eit) Ho: β = 1
Ha: β < 1
D-W
Taxation Items t-stats t - stats t-stats
GRPIT  0.651 0.482 0.198 2.526 ** 0.107 66.35 -10.22 *** 1.06
GRCIT -1.387 -0.604 0.608 4.570 *** 0.306 191.21 -2.94 *** 1.72
GRSIC  2.715 2.501 ** 0.173 2.747 *** 0.127 42.80 -13.13 *** 1.41
GRT -0.070 0.076 0.244 3.786 *** 0.228 44.99 -10.32 *** 1.12
Table 6C: Estimated β for Public Outlays, 1950-95
Name Alpha H0: α = 0  Beta H0: β= 0 Adj. D-W Var(eit)
t -  stats t - stats R-Sq
GDPMT 4.630 3.49 *** -0.183 -2.38 ** 0.094 1.24 63.99
GGSL 5.676 4.83 *** -0.137 -2.02 ** 0.064 1.35 50.21
GND -0.549 -0.18 0.228 1.29 0.015 0.74 337.22
GATE 2.395 2.27 ** 0.031 0.51 -0.017 1.56 40.33
GTND 3.780 3.14 *** -0.176 -2.52 ** 0.106 1.26 52.70
GGOV 1.850 1.35 ** 0.003 0.03 -0.023 1.57 68.51
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Appendix 3: Riskiness of Flows without the Korean War Period
CAPM: Next, we re-run all the regressions excluding the 1951-1952 Korean War years. First, we
look at the CAPM estimates which, given in Table 6D, change quite sharply. Essentially all the beta
coefficients decline. In particular, we find that there is no evidence of systematic risk in PIT. These
results suggest that the threat of a war may well contribute to the volatility of the revenue flows, and
thus result in a higher public discount rate. Comparing the risk discount rates based on this set of
beta’s and those discussed in the text, (i.e., Table 9, inclusive of the War period), the new values all
decline by about a full percentage point for projects financed with CIT, PIT and total revenue.
Specifically, the declines are 1.18, 0.95, 0.84 percent, respectively, in the three cases. Thus, the
"peace dividend" comes in the form of a one-percentage point drop in the borrowing cost for public
projects, which is significant. 
APT: We now turn to the results from the arbitrage model, which are given in Table 8A below.
Once again, a similar pattern as the one described in the preceding paragraph emerges.
Appendix 4: Predicting the long run economic growth rate.
The expected long run growth rate of GDP per person is found to be:
tg = .
t - s t at s .
$ 212
5 74
Thus the resulting GDP growth figure of 2.12 percent is consistent with the findings of Maddison
(1991), which clearly reflects the secular growth in total factor productivity. The residuals from this
regression form a proxy for the GDP macroeconomic factor and are shown in the figure below.
From the above figure we observe that the macroeconomic growth factor behaves like a white noise
error. The mean of the factor is zero with a variance of 6.26 which appears relatively large. The
auto-correlation function shows the extent of correlation between neighbouring data points in the
series (i.e., between F1t and that of F1t-1, F1t-2 ,F1t-3 ,F1t-4 etc). As seen from the next table, the auto-
correlations provide an indication that the macroeconomic factor is indeed a white noise term.
Furthermore, the partial correlation measures the correlation between F1t and Ft-p, after the effects of
F1t-1, F1t-2, F1t-3, F1t-4 .... have been taken into account. The diagram does indicate that the partial
autocorrelations are all relatively small just as the autocorrelation. All the sample autocorrelations
and partial autocorrelations are statistically insignificant as is indicated by the high probability of a
type I error and the low t-statistics. The Langrange multiplier and the Ljung-Box-Pierce statistics
indicate that the factor behaves randomly (see Table on next page).
GDP  Macro Factor
-10
-5
0
5
10
1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998
Time
%
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Lag Rho t-stats LM-test Q Test p-value Partial t-stats
1  0.26  1.73 1.79 3.36 0.07  0.26  1.73
2 -0.15 -1.00 1.01 4.51 0.11 -0.23 -1.53
3 -0.14 -0.93 0.97 5.57 0.14 -0.04 -0.26
4  0.00  0.00 0.00 5.57 0.23  0.03  0.20
5 -0.03 -0.20 0.20 5.62 0.34 -0.09 -0.60
6 -0.20 -1.33 1.39 7.75 0.26 -0.19 -1.26
7 -0.08 -0.53 0.55 8.09 0.32  0.03  0.20
8 -0.12 -0.80 0.82 8.88 0.35 -0.21 -1.40
9 -0.17 -1.13 1.20 10.58 0.30 -0.17 -1.13
10 -0.05 -0.33 0.37 10.75 0.38 -0.02 -0.13
11  0.16  1.07 1.12 12.31 0.34  0.08  0.53
12  0.09  0.16 0.62 12.80 0.38 -0.11 -0.73
Table 6D: Estimated βeta for Tax Revenues and Outlays using the Method of Group Averages: 1952-95
Name αi+ α1I H0: α1I=0 Beta H0: β = 0 Adj Var(eit) Ho: β = 1 D-W
Ha: α1i ≠ 0 Ha: β > 0 R-Sq Ha: β< 1
t-stats t - stats t-stats
Taxation Items
GRPIT 0.407 0.376 0.078 1.089 0.004 39.86 -12.80 *** 2.16
GRCIT -2.057 -0.906 0.550 3.633 *** 0.221 176.00 -2.97 *** 1.99
GRSIC 2.458 2.438 ** 0.131 1.947 * 0.061 34.68 -12.94 *** 2.04
GRT -0.365 -0.399 0.158 2.598 *** 0.118 28.57 -13.80 *** 2.01
Expenditure Items
GDPMT 4.951 4.389 *** -0.138 -1.836 ** 0.052 43.42 1.84
GGLSG 5.573 4.442 *** -0.104 -1.249 0.013 53.70 1.75
GND -2.074 -1.722 * -0.036 -0.447 -0.019 49.51 2.15
GATE 2.548 2.380 ** 0.059 0.830 -0.007 39.10 1.78
GRTND 4.390 4.313 *** -0.162 -2.395 ** 0.099 35.35 2.41
GGOV 1.470 1.732 * -0.087 -1.535 0.031 24.56 2.36
Note: *** indicates that the beta is statistically significant different from the null hypothesis at the 1 percent
level of significance, while ** does so at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level.
.
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Table 8A: The General APT model using the Method of Group Averages: 1952-1995
Name Expected
Growth
Beta
Sensitivity:
Unexpected
GDP Shocks
Sensitivity:
Unexpected
“Stock
Market”
Shocks
Adj.
R-sq
D-W
ERM 7.110 1.658 0.020 2.06
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 3.120 *** 1.388
GRCIT 1.853 4.379 0.416 0.463 2.19
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 1.116 5.039 *** 3.703 *** 
Ho : α22 = 1, t-stats -5.200 ***
GRPIT 0.964 1.629 0.079 0.247 2.08
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 1.165 3.760 *** 1.405
GSIC 3.388 0.349 0.138 0.086 2.28
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 3.868 *** 0.762 2.336 **
GRT 0.762 1.656 0.139 0.422 2.42
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 1.168 4.852 *** 3.145 ***
GDPMT 3.970 -1.392 -0.126 0.199 1.75
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 4.346 *** -2.911 *** -2.045 **
GGLSG 4.831 -0.355 -0.120 0.023 2.32
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 4.395 *** -0.617 -1.618
GND -2.330  0.410 -0.072 -0.010 1.22
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats -2.205 **  0.741 -1.001
GATE 2.969  0.900  0.035 0.040 1.78
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 3.226 ***  1.870 *  0.556
GRTND 3.235 -0.132 -0.140 0.070 2.11
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 3.551 *** -0.276 -2.268 **
GGOV 0.853 0.074 -0.115 0.075 1.89
Ho : αi = 0, t-stats 1.168 0.194 -2.331 **
